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Oliver Marchart’s new book stretches his political ontology to its logical implications extending 
and reworking some of the central insights of Ernesto Laclau’s post-Marxism. At the same time, 
however, Marchart may perhaps be too deferent to, or possibly overly invested in, Laclau’s leg-
acy in ways that threaten to compromise the radical potential of his own reconceptualisation of 
antagonism. This critical review seeks to uncover in Marchart’s ontology of the political the un-
tapped potential for a radical political stasiology by building on his earlier concept of political 
difference.   
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As someone who has been persistently prodding Oliver Marchart to stretch his 
political ontology to its logical implications (Paipais 2017a; 2017b), I cannot but 
praise the publication of Thinking Antagonism for taking a step to that direction 
(Marchart, 2018).1 From a profound reconstruction of the post-Marxist concept of 
antagonism to the elaboration of a systematic ‘ontology of the political’ (p. 3), this 
volume takes Ernesto Laclau’s post-Marxist insights to their logical conclusion, 
while further unpacking some of the implications of Marchart’s own political on-
tology. At the same time, however, it leaves one with the impression that Marchart 
is perhaps too deferent to, or possibly overly invested in, Laclau’s legacy in ways 
that threaten to compromise the radical potential of his own argument. At any 
 
* Parts of this essay are based on my review of Marchart’s book in Constellations, 26(3): 504-6 
republished here with Wiley’s kind permission. 
1 All subsequent references to Marchart (2018) will be indicated by using page numbers in the 
text. 
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rate, as this is a book that slaughters many sacred cows in philosophy and political 
theory, it may equally cause outrage, astonishment, disagreement, admiration, or 
unconditional praise, but only great books can engender such mixed reactions 
thanks to the wealth of provocative ideas and creative rereadings they propose. 
THE PROMISE OF AN ONTOLOGY OF THE POLITICAL  
Marchart’s main objective in the book is to offer a political ontology – or, ra-
ther, an ‘ontology of the political’, as he puts it for good reasons – that fleshes out 
some of the ideas already inherent, but not fully spelled out, in Laclau’s post-
Marxism. In this respect, the book goes beyond the Laclau (and Mouffe, 1985) of 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy and draws on some of the breakthroughs that 
Laclau achieved at a later stage, following Žižek’s Lacanian critique, as outlined in 
his New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time (Laclau, 1990), his On Popu-
list Reason (Laclau, 2005) and his posthumous collection of essays, The Rhetori-
cal Foundations of Society (Laclau, 2014). The central intuition Marchart borrows 
from Laclau (but also from Lefort, Mouffe, Nancy and other post-foundationalist 
thinkers) is that the political is the moment of institution/de-institution of society 
that, in line with the post-Marxist nomenclature, he calls antagonism. Yet, in Mar-
chart, antagonism is inflated to become the name not only for the ‘ontic’ battles 
social actors conduct in society, but primarily for the ‘political nature of social be-
ing as such’ (p. 3). This is a maximalist claim that Marchart defends throughout 
the book, initially by offering a genealogy of the idea of antagonism that harks 
back to the legacy of German Idealism and Marxism.  
The first part of the book expands on the main difference Marchart identifies 
between his ontological conception of antagonism and those older renditions of 
Marxism or some more contemporary ontological discourses, such as those of-
fered by Michel Foucault, Bernard Stiegler, and Nicole Loraux, which Marchart 
deems as ontic polemologies that do not go far enough in their theorisation of an-
tagonism. In a nutshell, his critique amounts to claiming that, after the 
Heideggerian attack on metaphysical foundations, ‘we’ have come to recognise 
that antagonism does not operate solely on the ontic level of conflictuality (as ‘class 
struggle’ or ontic ‘polemology’), but it rather bears an ontological quality it shares 
with the Hegelian notion of radical negativity. In fact, Marchart audaciously brings 
together Heideggerian fundamental ontology, Lacanian psychoanalysis, and the 
Hegelian notion of reflective negation2 to defend a reformulation of antagonism as 
 
2 In the Science of Logic, Hegel (1995: 407) carefully distinguishes two senses of negativity that 
in many ways resemble the Heidegerrian distinction between the ontic and the ontological. On the 
one hand, negativity as reflective designates the purely negative process of Becoming as self-differing 
or moving-away-from which is independent of specific content. Negativity here becomes the condi-





the inaccessible Real of political ontology, responsible both for the grounding of 
the social and for its unravelling in situations of crisis, be it either revolution, dis-
sent or protestation (in a sense, as constituent power always mediated through on-
tic, either hegemonic or counter-hegemonic, politics).  
In the second part of the book, Marchart outlines the ‘symbolic onto-logic’ of 
the construction of ontic politics corresponding to his radical rethinking of antag-
onism. Marchart is adamant that there are certain minimal conditions that need to 
be in place before any action is recognised as political. Faithful to the radical 
democratic tradition that equates politics with collective mobilisation, he restricts 
politics to an act of collective will, strategically pursued, aiming to ‘usurp’ the uni-
versal, i.e. create a chain of equivalences that would transform a mere sectional 
request into a social demand, with an eye on achieving a hegemonic status (so pol-
itics, even if not numerically, at least symbolically should be majoritarian targeting 
people’s ‘hearts and minds’ as an expression of universal aspirations). Marchart 
consciously sides here with those definitions of politics that view it necessarily as 
militant or oppositional activism pursuing either hegemony or counter-hegemony 
building. Either way, social action for Marchart is worthy of the name politics only 
if it generates the very negativity that the political qua antagonism seems to be the 
marker of on the ontological level. Consequently, not everything is political for 
Marchart, but even within sedimented forms of the social (institutions, bureaucra-
cies, even regular family or personal relations), the political qua antagonism lies in 
hibernation or, as Marchart somewhat poetically puts it citing Nancy, ‘trembles’ 
(p. 106) inconspicuously, awaiting reactivation through protest politics. 
The next logical step in Marchart’s radicalisation of the concept of antagonism 
is to make a claim which is even more provocative, yet follows directly from his 
conception of antagonism-as-the-name-of-the-political. Marchart’s wager is that 
thinking itself is an inescapably militant, contentious, collective, and partisan activi-
ty, elevated to its true potential only when it goes beyond mere conceptuality, 
namely beyond serving as the theoretical component of the various scientific dis-
ciplines that sustain the sedimented or reproductive practices of a given society. 
Philosophy, in other words, assumes its true dignity, so to speak, only as far as it, 
not only reflects, but also critically enacts or reactivates dormant possibilities with-
in the social (according to Marchart, only when ontology becomes prima philoso-
phia). Marchart’s radical re-conceptualisation of antagonism thus comes full circle. 
Thinking, being and acting are at once penetrated by the political, perceived as the 
 
tion of possibility for any differentiation, identity, or particularity within the ontic world. On the oth-
er hand, negativity as qualitative is a mediated negation -reflecting the Spinozian dictum that ‘all de-
termination is negation’- which describes the way negation appears within existence as the affirma-
tion or identity of a thing as differing from its own opposite and from everything else. This parallel 
between Hegel’s and Heidegger’s discourse is premised on their agreement that pure negative activi-
ty is only visible in the world as ‘qualitative determinateness’. 
546  VASSILIOS PAIPAIS 
 
elusive dimension of radical negativity that does not come from the ‘outside’ but is 
generated by the very constitutive incompleteness of the social, manifested in the 
politico-intellectual terrain through the restless repetition or succession of ontic 
conflicts. 
ANTAGONISM OR POLITICAL DIFFERENCE? DIVIDING THE DIF-
FERENCE 
This is a tall order, indeed. Antagonism becomes the very name of the political 
qua radical negativity.3 Marchart blends his sources very skilfully but also often 
somewhat daringly. Heidegger and Hegel are intriguingly brought together in ways 
that can also be disconcerting, even for those like Marchart who reject Hegel’s 
panlogism, since the Hegelian politics of negativity (or, rather, the Hegelian-
Kojevian synthesis that Marchart defends) sits uneasily with late Heidegger’s poli-
tics of affirmative passivity. One does not have to be an Agambenian to see that 
Marchart’s too quick dismissal of the politics of affirmative passivity as passively 
nihilistic, anti-political, or even not really politics at all, accords primacy to a very 
specific (Machiavellian/Gramscian/Laclauian) understanding of political action 
that, even if not always directly voluntarist, it is at least identified with success, ef-
fectivity, and mastery in an uneven social terrain riven by power asymmetries and 
inequalities. While Marchart may claim that his affirmation of concrete politics 
and his refusal to recognise a politics of abdication, to remember Blanchot’s 
(1986) coinage, from a harsh or unfavourable social reality is authorised ontologi-
cally, his very own formalisation of antagonism may be the first victim of such a 
narrow perspective. To paraphrase Agamben, antagonism as radical negativi-
ty/nothingness can easily become the final veil of language (i.e. a well-hidden ulti-
mate foundation),4 obstructing access to a view of political difference as a produc-
tive threshold where the political and its infinite cross-cuttings with politics are still 
indeterminable and thus open to multiple appropriations and diverse reincarna-
tions.                    
As Marchart (2007) has previously shown, the difference  between politics (any 
particular constituted order) and the political (the exception(s), contingency or 
pure difference that constitute it by transgressing it) is not simply another posited, 
 
3 Although it is not clear why antagonism should not rather be, as I will argue shortly, the name 
of the very difference between politics and the political, which would have perhaps saved Marchart 
from some unnecessary criticisms. 
4 ‘Nihilism experiences this very abandonment of the word by God. But it interprets the extreme 
revelation of language in the sense that there is nothing to reveal, that the truth of language is that it 
unveils the Nothing of all things. The absence of a metalanguage thus appears as the negative form 
of the presupposition, and the Nothing as the final veil, the final name of language’ (Agamben 1999: 
47). 





arbitrary structural necessity. It rather constitutes a necessary quasi-transcendental 
condition of possibility for any meaningful order of historicity to arise. Quasi-
transcendentality, here, stands for the paradoxical operation of the political as 
both belonging to the social order by authorizing the principle(s) of its constitution 
and being in a relation of constitutive exception to it. And yet, Marchart often ne-
glects to stress, or stress enough, that this is only half of the picture of the formal 
logic of double negation that governs political difference, namely that it is only the 
part that corresponds to the operation of the political as constitutive exception of 
every particular sociopolitical order. The other crucially important dimension is 
the radical impotence penetrating the political itself that corresponds to the idea of 
the Lacanian Real as inexistent, incomplete, ‘non-All’.5 If this is so, my impression 
is that Marchart may have better served the radical potential of his argument had 
he focused more closely on Lacan’s formula of sexuation in articulating what is at 
stake in his wonderfully productive earlier concept of political difference. The lat-
ter signifies a radicalised, doubly split concept of antagonism that maps nicely onto 
the Lacanian idea of the absence of sexual difference, as the below long quote by 
Žižek (2012: 760-1) suggests:  
Sexual difference is thus ultimately not the difference between sexes, but the dif-
ference which cuts across the very heart of the identity of each sex, stigmatising it 
with the mark of impossibility… there is no relationship, il n’y a pas de rapport sex-
uel – the two sexes are out of sync…Lacan defines the desire of the analyst not as a 
pure desire…but as a desire to obtain absolute difference. In order for the difference 
to be ‘absolute’, it must be a redoubled, self-reflected difference a difference of dif-
ferences, and this is what the formulae of sexuation offer: the ‘dynamic’ antinomy of 
All and its exception, and the ‘mathematic’ antinomy of non-All without exception. 
In other words, there is no direct way to formulate sexual difference: sexual differ-
ence names the Real of an antagonism which can only be circumscribed through 
two different contradictions. 
The upshot of this formula is that the masculine logic of the political as consti-
tutive exception to politics (the still Schmittian/Hegelian/Kojevian logic of antago-
nism as radical negativity) is doubly split by the feminine logic of the ontological-
political as constitutively ‘non-All’. This is not, anymore, obeying the logic of the 
transgression that sustains the law (any hegemonic normative socio-political order 
and its transgression in the form of anti-hegemonic politics) but of love as fulfil-
ment of the law (the double negation or division of the division that deactivates the 
violence of the law). Such a logic authorises forms of politics, namely incarnations 
of a ‘non-All’ universal, that operate as embodiments of failure, incompleteness, 
messianic weakness, brokenness; not only as the failure to fill the absent fullness 
 
5 The aspect of the political as the constitutive exception to politics corresponds to the masculine 
side of Lacan’s formula of sexuation whereas the idea of the political as inherently incomplete or 
‘non-All’ to the feminine side, see Žižek (2012: 764-771).  
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of society, but as renewal and hope, as the logic of transfiguration of the political 
itself, of what it means to act politically.     
The double formalisation of political difference described here is not captured 
by the foundational prejudices of regional ontologies, but constitutes a formal on-
tology or, else, a type of political ontology that undermines the logic of founda-
tionalism from within without falling back to either the abstract exteriority of a 
‘false’ transcendence or the incessant immanence of a self-enclosed agonistic total-
ity. Transcendence, in that sense, is neither exalted nor domesticated nor dis-
missed. It is rather reconstrued to signify the void within immanence as the condi-
tion of possibility for historicity itself. Critique then rests on this irreducible double 
gap (the gap between the Real and the Symbolic for Žižek or, as Benjamin and 
Agamben would have it, the Pauline ‘division of the division’) within historical 
forms of social identification that both enables social reproduction and prevents its 
ossification by producing a remnant that deactivates and denaturalises social and 
political order without discarding it.6  
Such a critical formalism is also genuinely materialist7 in the sense that radical 
negativity or pure difference understood as the ‘internal-external’ excess/gap of 
signification – that is, as emerging in the intersection of the Real and the Symbolic 
-  explains empirical differentiation and multiplicity, not as emanating from the in-
finity of positive historical actualities (which would make the contingency of posi-
tive worlds not necessary but contingent), but rather from an originary antagonism 
(a globalised civil war or stasis as an ontological condition and a zone of indistinc-
tion between order and disorder) that makes these actualities (im)possible in the 
first place (see also Agamben, 2015; Vardoulakis, 2017). Such a civil war, such a 
stasis, becomes the ontological condition of (im)possibility of the politics/political 
double negation. Stasis, here, does not signify any prejudice in favour of ontic 
mobility, upheaval, anarchy, or irregularity. As the term’s ambiguity itself suggests, 
denoting both immobility and unrest, stasis operates not only as the ontological 
condition of possibility for the constitution/de-constitution of any particular order, 
but also the internal block in any constituted order that undermines its fulfillment, 
 
6 Such a perspective that has recently inspired the work of Critchley (2012), Žižek (2003) and 
Agamben (2005) is often described as Pauline meontology from St Paul’s First Letter to the Corin-
thians (7: 29-32) where the life of the messianic subject is described as an existence where every as-
pect of this world is experienced as passing away in a process whereby every worldly activity is not 
nullified by its opposite but suspended (‘as though not’, hōs me) in the nothingness that constitutes 
its groundless ground.    
7 In a counterintuitive critique of traditional notions of dialectical materialism, Žižek proposes an 
alternative understanding of the term based on the idea that we conceive the ‘material’ not as an all-
encompassing fundament, a totalising ground of reality or history, but rather as ‘non-All’, as the 
marker of the incompleteness of being (see Žižek, 2011). 





completion, innocence, and self-sufficiency. In other words, it stands in for politi-
cal difference itself as a double caesura between politics and the political. 
It is also important to note here that, unlike Agamben’s (1998) excessive overi-
dentification of sovereign power with governmentality (that transforms the physical 
existence of individuals into a political state of exception, which is paradoxically 
maintained into perpetuity), this reading of political difference as stasis conceives 
of sovereignty, not as necessarily murderous politics or biopolitical depoliticisa-
tion, but rather as ‘nothing but a name for the impossibility of self-immanence and 
hence the designator of the infra-structurally necessary alterity that constitutes or-
der’ (Prozorov, 2005: 88). Sovereignty, then, rather than being necessarily disas-
trous or oblivious of the political, is itself this zone of indistinction or indifference 
that Agamben (2015: 11) ascribes to the concept of stasis. In particular, it stands 
for two ontological possibilities or, rather, it signifies two ways of instantiating the 
political: a) as a defensive, claustrophobic, and oblivious delimitation of the 
boundaries of political community sustaining a clear designation of the communi-
ty’s internal and external enemies (sovereignty as the restrainer (katechon) of so-
cial chaos and disorder and the guarantor of political unity), as in Schmitt (2003, 
p. 60; 2008, p. 92) and Machiavelli (1996), and/or b) as a constant interrogation of 
society’s principle of constitution (see Lefort, 1988; Žižek, 1999; Marchart, 2007; 
Stavrakakis, 2006; Honig, 2009).  
The second possibility should not be envisaged simply as perpetuating the 
structural impossibility of achieving another type of community, designated by var-
ious poststructuralist thinkers as the ‘unavowable’ (Blanchot, 1988), ‘inoperative’ 
(Nancy, 1991) or ‘coming’ (Agamben, 1993) community, lest this structural im-
pediment -envisaged by Lefort as the ‘empty place of power’- turns into another 
depoliticising device that may well imagine an agonistic politics of reform and re-
foundation, but could never fathom the possibility of absolute renewal or trans-
formation of the political (see Wenman 2013). The evocation of the transgressive 
nature of the political and the unstable fixity of every constituted order can, in 
other words, almost imperceptibly be turned into a pretext for new forms of depo-
liticisation that may perpetually defer any commitment to dangerous or so-called 
‘lost causes’ (see Žižek 2009).        
It is for this reason that it does not suffice to defend the ‘impossibility of society’ 
as the ultimate hallmark and guide of a politics of repoliticisation and resistance. 
One needs to be mindful, here, of the possibility that a historicist understanding of 
antagonism may undermine the truth of antagonism itself. It is mainly for this rea-
son that Žižek took issue with what he took to be a historicist appropriation of an-
tagonism by early Laclau and Mouffe. In a critical review of Hegemony and So-
cialist Strategy, Žižek (1990) attacked the apparently innocent question of the rela-
tionship between antagonism and the theory of subjectivation in Laclau & 
Mouffe’s landmark book. The argument is that antagonism undercuts the text’s 
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insufficiently radicalised vision of the subject of the political. Hegemony remains 
trapped, argued Žižek, in an Althusserian vision of the subject, one which con-
ceives of society as discursively hegemonised by ‘subject-positions’ each of which 
brings its own ‘point of view’ on political matters. As Brockelman (2003, p. 190) 
has noted, however, such a vision of the political implicitly already substantialises 
society –suggesting a master ‘viewpoint’ of the social itself, a viewpoint from which 
all the discourses of the ‘subject-positions’ are exposed as limited and ideological. 
Antagonism, then, becomes a form of historicism that reproduces the image of 
society as a dynamic, yet unpunctured, totality.    
In that sense, when one prefigures the content of critical discourse or prede-
termines the meaning of emancipation, resistance, and solidarity or apriori stipu-
lates that ‘the name of politics is populism’, one refuses the practical imperative 
implicit in antagonism –an imperative to contest the independence and finality of 
any substantial identity or ontic designation-  that eventually does violence to the 
truth of antagonism, to antagonism as truth. Instead, as Žižek (2000, p. 100) writes, 
we should appreciate how 
the impossibility at work…is double: not only does ‘radical antagonism’ mean that 
it is impossible adequately to represent/articulate the fullness of society – on an even 
more radical level, it is also impossible adequately to represent/articulate this very 
antagonism/negativity that prevents Society from achieving its full ontological realiza-
tion.8  
As to how to project a formal condition so radical that it refuses to be hyposta-
tised as content or the form of a content, Žižek’s answer -repeated throughout his 
prolific writings- marries the Hegelian notion of ‘concrete universality’ with the 
Lacanian notion of the ‘Real’. Antagonism punctures the very rift between form 
and content by simultaneously appearing at both poles of the political difference: 
the political cannot appear without the ordeal of politics exposing its radical nulli-
ty, while politics are always already penetrated by the political as the exceptionality 
grounding its very (im)possibility. Paradoxically, truth always emerges both as a 
particular ontic content –the problematic site of social definition/exclusion, the de-
fining historical moment, etc.– and as the immanent void universal form/horizon 
that makes possible all those particular contents. In this peculiar double lack, an-
tagonism challenges all ‘pictures’ of society, both one asserting that there is One 
picture of society or one name of politics and the one asserting that there is no pic-
ture of society (namely that all there is are hegemonic particularities usurping the 
 
8 Or as Žižek puts it, how antagonism arises immanently as the very logic of difference between 
Laclau’s difference and equivalence (differentiality): ‘it is not only that the difference between the 
field itself and its outside has to be reflected into the field itself, preventing its closure, thwarting 
fullness, it is also that the differential identity of every element is simultaneously constituted and 
thwarted by the differential network’ (2012, p. 771, n48) 





universal); for it insists on re-dividing the form within the particular content that 
produces it. 
OSTINATO RIGORE INDEED 
Such a formal political ontology that is trying to capture the truth of antagonism 
in double negation serves the same aspiration that drives Marchart’s call for ‘ob-
stinate rigour’ in intellectual engagement in the conclusion of his book. The sup-
plementary claim, however, that such a paradigm is putting forward (in the Der-
ridean fashion of both destabilising Marchart’s intellectual edifice and enabling a 
different, slightly displaced, outlook) is that, if Marchart is to remain faithful to his 
own rigorous ‘ethics of intellectual engagement’ (p.  210), he should be able to en-
visage a form of politics that undermines the ability of protest politics (with popu-
lism as its master signifier par excellence) to monopolise what politics is. Put dif-
ferently, he should be able to also capture, and so formalise, a type of politics as 
affirmative passivity rendering politics open to another use by ‘saving’ it from the 
very depoliticisation that a view of populism or protest politics as the absolute in-
carnation of the political-qua-antagonism would risk. The stakes here are high 
since this means that a truly radical formalisation of an ontology of the political 
qua antagonism (or, rather, political difference) may entail keeping the realms of 
thought and praxis distinct (yet not separate). Otherwise, one risks compromising 
thought (critique) by overcommitting to a form of militant politics or a paradigm of 
political activation (protest politics or populism as the name or minimal condition 
of politics), elevated to the privileged manifestation of ontological antagonism.  
Marchart, of course, stresses more than once that, due to the incomplete nature 
of the social, any sedimentation of the political in the form of institutionalised he-
gemony is fated to crumble or, as Schürmann (2003) puts it, hegemonies are des-
tined to be broken. Yet, a possibility he does not seriously entertain is that the 
blind spot of every hegemonic articulation (rhetoric, or discourse) is the suppres-
sion of its own internal other, which then authorises a paradigm of political 
(re)activation and militancy that rests on the (often violent or oppressive) denial of 
its own failure. By raising this point, I am not suggesting Marchart should rather 
side with Agamben, Benjamin or Schürmann, as opposed to Laclau, or proclaim 
anarchism or messianic nihilism, rather than populism or radical democracy, as 
the name of politics. I am rather arguing that an ‘obstinately rigorous’ (p. 211) po-
litical articulation of antagonism, according to Marchart’s own terms, should be 
able to accommodate both ‘onto-logics’: that of the political as constituent power 
or force of grounding/de-grounding the social and as destituent power, as a ‘weak’ 
drive, always already penetrated by the splinters of deactivation (to jointly para-
phrase Benjamin and Agamben) that may open politics to a new use beyond the 
unending hegemony/counter-hegemony dialectic as ‘a brute factum politicum’ (p. 
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208). Eventually, the vision of political ontology recommended here seeks to for-
malise both the Bartlebian politics of detachment, civil disobedience, or passive 
resistance and the Machiavellian/Gramscian/Laclauian model of political activa-
tion as both equally nameable forms of political praxis without foreclosing either. 
It, therefore, resists an exclusionary, absolute definition of politics as a discourse 
of mastery, efficiency, or will-to-power without re-inscribing this resistance into an 
economy of determinate negation.  
Despite then his promising formalisation of antagonism, the legacy of Laclau 
may function as more than a straight-jacket for Marchart. It runs the risk of be-
coming a distorting mirror that reflects Laclau’s own limited or one-dimensional 
appropriation of the political difference and holds back the resources – already 
inherent in Marchart’s project – for a truly radical political stasiology9 faithful both 
to thought (imagination/critique) and to politics (or, rather, its unpredictability, in-
determinacy, and frailty). It is a testament to the brilliance of Thinking Antago-
nism that it charts the way to such a task by stretching Laclau’s legacy to its very 
limits. However, it falls short of taking the final step. Inheritance is indeed a heavy 
burden, yet often nothing serves its full assumption better than the symbolic act of 
‘killing the father’.      
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